In the days leading up to the deadly attack at Crocus City Hall near Moscow, involving gunmen affiliated with ISIS-K, the U.S. embassy in Moscow had issued a warning about a potential extremist threat at a concert venue. This warning was supported by American intelligence, which had been tracking the group closely and deemed the threat credible. However, Russian President Vladimir Putin dismissed these warnings as “outright blackmail” and attempts to destabilize the country. After the attack, ISIS quickly claimed responsibility, with the attackers identified as being from Tajikistan.
Russia’s own security establishment had acknowledged the domestic threat posed by ISIS-K in the days before the attack, particularly regarding ethnic Tajiks radicalized by the group. Despite internal intelligence warnings about a potential attack, Russia’s vast intelligence and law enforcement apparatus failed to prevent the deadliest terrorist attack in the country in nearly two decades. Russian officials are now pointing fingers at Ukraine, trying to deflect attention from questions surrounding their failure to prevent the attack.
Experts and security officials attribute the failure to prevent the concert attack to a combination of factors, including deep distrust within the Russian security establishment and its relations with global intelligence agencies. They also point to distractions within Russia’s security apparatus, such as its focus on political crackdowns at home and conflicts with Ukraine and the West. The difficulty in disrupting covert international terror plots is also highlighted, particularly with the need for efficient intelligence sharing and good coordination.
The Russian government’s definition of extremism has expanded under Putin’s rule, with the counterterrorism agency focusing on a broader range of targets beyond Islamist extremists, including political dissenters, LGBTQ activists, and other critics of the regime. This expansion has diverted attention and resources away from real threats, leading to what some European security officials call a focus on “fictitious threats.” The Russian security services remain robustly staffed and funded, even amid the intensifying domestic political crackdown and conflict with Ukraine.
The warnings issued by the U.S. embassy in Moscow before the attack, based on specific threat information, led to increased security measures at the concert venue. Despite these measures, one of the attackers was able to enter the venue undetected. Russian authorities initially responded to the warnings, with a raid targeting ISIS-K operatives in Moscow. However, skepticism grew within the Russian government, leading Putin to criticize the warnings in a speech, blaming the West for attempting to undermine Russia.
When the CIA informed Russia about the potential terror plot, it was following “duty to warn” directives that require informing about specific threats of violence. While the United States has been tracking ISIS-K activities closely, the adversarial relationship between Washington and Moscow limited the sharing of intelligence beyond what was necessary. In the aftermath of the attack, Russia has shifted blame to the United States, claiming possible American complicity in the attack. Overall, the failure to prevent the concert attack in Moscow highlights the challenges of intelligence sharing, coordination, and trust in preventing terrorist threats.
