In July 2004, the 9/11 Commission proposed sweeping changes to the U.S. intelligence community, including the creation of the director of national intelligence (DNI) role. The DNI was designed to coordinate between 17 American intelligence agencies and implement a holistic vision for intelligence operations in the country. With cabinet-level authority, the DNI has significant influence over the president and U.S. policy on intelligence and national security matters.
Israel’s intelligence community recently failed to prevent a coordinated Hamas assault, highlighting the need for comprehensive reforms within the country’s intelligence infrastructure. One proposal for improvement is the establishment of a civilian-led organization to oversee Israeli intelligence operations, which currently lack coordination. Israel’s intelligence landscape consists of Military Intelligence, Mossad, and Shin Bet, each with different responsibilities and reporting structures, leading to challenges in collaboration and coordination.
Following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, Israel’s intelligence agencies established research and analysis branches, but Military Intelligence maintains a monopoly over intelligence collection and analysis due to its size and resources. The dispersion of responsibility among the agencies creates tension and competition, hindering effective cooperation. The mistaken belief that Hamas was deterred and not interested in war led to the intelligence community’s failure to anticipate the Oct. 7 attack and resulting massacre.
The appointment of an Israeli civilian DNI could help address strategic blindness and improve coordination among intelligence agencies to prevent future failures like the Oct. 7 attack. Additionally, increasing civilian and parliamentary oversight of the Israel Defense Forces and their procurement decisions is essential to ensure accountability and transparency. Despite skepticism towards civilian oversight within Israel’s military culture, demanding more oversight after a significant failure is necessary to prevent such incidents in the future.
Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich’s refusal to approve an IDF request for new fighter jets without a thorough review of the defense budget reflects a growing demand for accountability and oversight following the Oct. 7 attack. The need for reform in Israeli intelligence operations is not just about efficiency, but also about rebuilding trust and ensuring that those responsible for protecting the country are supervised and guided by a broader vision. These reforms aim to enhance intelligence operations, improve decision-making, and ultimately strengthen national security in Israel.
